Tianpeng Liu

This article is based on existing research and published archives and, by systematizing this information, seeks to reflect as fully as possible the process of decision-making on the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and the USSR in 1932. The main focus is on the analysis from the perspective of the Nanking government: the conceptual development and choice of interests of the Chinese and Soviet sides in the issues of Sino-Soviet relations and interaction with Japan during this period are examined. Soviet-Chinese diplomatic relations after 1931 underwent a relatively difficult process of reconstruction. Much of the Chinese and Russian literature provides limited analysis of this topic with simplistic conclusions. Due to widespread contradictions between China and the USSR, the Nanjing government was mistrustful of developing relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, faced with unrest beyond the Far Eastern border, the USSR, out of caution and “distrust of the Nanking government,” also took a series of actions that were seen as “developing Japan-Soviet relations.” Under increasing pressure, China finally decided to start negotiations with the USSR to unconditionally restore diplomatic relations to prevent the Soviet Union from getting too close to Japan. The fact that the USSR gradually began to view Japan as a factor of instability also created conditions for the restoration of Soviet-Chinese diplomatic relations and their further development.

This article is based on existing research and published archives and, by systematizing this information, seeks to reflect as fully as possible China’s and the USSR’s judgment of the situation during the 1938 Soviet-Japanese border con-flict and the range of actions taken on the basis of that judgment. After the Lake Hasan conflict widened, the Chinese government believed that war would break out between Japan and the USSR, so it began to actively ally itself with the USSR both politically and militarily. While holding Wuhan, the Chinese army began planning counter-offensives and attempted to draw the USSR and Japan into a full-scale war. However, the conflict between Japan and the USSR did not escalate into a military clash. At this stage, the USSR also hoped that China would continue to share Japan’s military pressure, and after the Japan-Soviet peace talks, still insisted that the Chi-nese army launch a counteroffensive. After the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the USSR’s vision could not be realized, and as a result, mutual dissatisfaction gradu-ally grew between China and the USSR. In such a situation, the close Sino-Soviet relations formed on the basis of the goal of “joint resistance to Japanese expansion” also began to be adversely affected, and after the conflict at Lake Hasan, these contradictions between the two sides also became one of the factors behind the emergence of disagreements between China and the USSR later on Soviet military aid to China and other issues.