Japan’s initiatives to strengthen the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific

Abstract

In recent years, global and regional crises have prompted Japan to strengthen its defense capabilities, deepen military alliances, and develop a network of strategic partnerships both within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. A country that for decades relied primarily on its alliance with the United States is now seeking to become a more active and autonomous regional actor that helps shape rules and build coalitions. Despite a growing body of research on Japan’s foreign policy strategy, the implications of the course toward strengthening Japan’s international role in the field of security remain insufficiently explored, particularly in terms of how this approach influences regional cooperation frameworks such as QUAD and Japan’s engagement with ASEAN countries. The article examines Japan’s use of the FOIP and QUAD frameworks as instruments of foreign policy influence and advancement of strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The relevance of the topic is underscored by the intensifying geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the escalating situation around Taiwan, and China’s increasing military and political activity. Japan’s shift toward a more active role in regional security highlights the internal contradiction between its constitutionally enshrined limitations and the growing need to contribute to the regional security order. This tension presents a key challenge for the current cabinet: to maintain economically beneficial relations with China while adhering to a security discourse centered on military buildup and responding to U.S. demands for a greater Japanese contribution to regional defense.

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